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Abstract. This paper contains general considerations on the 
safety indicators, with details at the system level and for the 
operator actions. 
For the system analysis, a modular analysis at a low detailed 
level is proposed (Nodule System Approach) in order to emphasize 
the safety related aspects at the subsystem (module) level. 
The operator actions are divided in "active actions" (actions in 
the control room during incident/accident situations) and "pas-
sive actions" (actions during tests, maintenance, repairs, etc.) 
and are analyzed separately. 
In the second part, a discussion of a possible way to apply some 
SI to the TfUX2 accident sequence for FORSMARK-3, is done. For 
the analysis of the Auxiliary Feedwater Systems (AFWS) an equa-
tion is proposed to derive target values for the failure proba-
bility on demand at the train level, given the target value at 
the system level,- including the common cause failures between the 
redundant trains. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The operation of a nuclear plant and the authorizing process 
require a continuous evaluation of ths risk and safety related 
aspects. Useful and comprehensive information is contained in the 
existing PSA-reports but this is difficult to be used unless an 
appropriate organization of this data is made. It must also be 
noted that the conditions in the plant during normal operation 
are different from those considered in PSA (components unavail-
able during repairs or TfcM, systems in alternate configurations 
or operation modes etc.) and all these aspects must be considered 
in the decision process with safety significance. 
Therefore a post-analysis of the PSA results is necessary with 
development of tools as "Living PSA" package (pre-processed 
information, updatable reliability data bases, simplified risk 
model for the plant etc.) and a set of Safety Indicators (SI) 
which should allow a continuous evaluation of the risk and safety 
in the quantitative and qualitative terms, to cope with the 
specific demands and concerns at different levels (regulatory, 
management, operation, etc.). 
The objective of this report is to clarify some aspects on Sis 
with emphasis on the indicators related to the operator and to 
the (safety) systems. 
Based on the available information, an application for the TfUX2 
accident sequence for FORSMARK-3 reactor is done. However, the 
lack of data on: 
- operating modes, process parameters, alternate configura-
tions, structure and boundary links of the Auxiliary Feed-
water System (AFWS) with other systems 
test and maintenance 
operating experience 
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safety philosophy and the quantitative and qualitative 
criteria already accepted for FORSMARK-3 
have a negative effect on the results. 
2. CATEGORIES OF SAFETY INDICATORS 
Before establishing a set of Safety Indicators, the identifica-
tion of the users and their demands is a first problem to be 
solved. This is obvious because of the different ways in which 
the safety is perceived at different levels. The appropriate 
parameters "seen" as defining the safety and acceptable quantita-
tive and qualitative evaluation should then be stated. 
On the other hand, safety indicators are often included in the 
more general class of Performance Indicators (PI) as it should be 
seen from a list with NRC Performance Indicators, /9/, Table 1, 
and WANO Indicators /9/, Table 2. These indicators reflects 
different approaches to express the performance and the safety of 
the plants. The limits for the areas nonaction-warning-action to 
improve safety, at the plant level, could be established versus 
the value of such indicators, because their ability to describe 
in a simplified form, from the safety standpoint, long periods of 
operation (ex: (Number of) Unplanned Automatic Scrams While 
Critical). However, the degree of generality is so high (ex: 
"Collective radiation exposure") that these indicators does not 
offer information on the events which might cause an eventual 
increase of the risk or on the ways to improve the safety. 
Therefore, at the utility level, and for authorization activities 
during operation, different indicators should be used. 
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Table 1. MRC Performance Indicators, /9/ (partial list). 
Automatic Scrams While Critical 
Safety System Actuations 
Significant Events 
Safety System Failures 
Forced Outage Rate 
Equipment Forced Outage per 1000 Critical Hours 
Collective Radiation Expo.-ure 
Table 2. WANO Performance Indicators, /9/. 
Unit Capability Factor 
Unplanned Capability Loss Factor 
Unplanned Automatic Scrams per 7000 Hours Critical 
Safety System Performance 
Thermal Performance 
Fuel Reliability 
Collective Radiation Exposure 
Volume of Low-level Solid Radioactive Waste 
Chemistry Index 
Industrial Safety Loss Time Accident Rate 
They are mainly related to the risk evaluation using the informa-
tion and knowledge included in the PSA analysis. 
As results from /13/, many Safety Quantitative Guidelines are 
derived from PSA and are calculated for different levels (system 
level, level 1, level 2 or level 3) according to the PSA level 
used to express the probability of the consequences. Many pro-
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babilistic Si's, expressing the availability requirements for the 
safety systems or safety functions or the core Belt probability 
are implemented as authorization criteria /9/, /13/. 
Details on the methodology to derive SI at different levels 
are given in /7/ and /10/, including the aspects related to the 
test and maintenance (T 6 M) activities, /ll/, /12/. Important 
requirements which the SI must satisfy, as formulated in /1G/, 
are related to the necessity of showing, as accurate as possible, 
the permanent changes in the performance of the plant, from a 
safety point of view. 
2.1. Indicators for Safety Systems 
During operation, for a specific state of the plant, the overall 
risk and consequences expected at the occurance of an Initiating 
Event depend on the answer of the facility-operator complex 
system. The effectiveness of this answer represents the measure 
in which the Safety Functions (SF) at the plant level, are 
performed. 
The state of the plant is appropriate from the safety standpoint 
if the SF's are properly covered. Further, an SF is properly 
covered when the systems involved (and also the operator) are in 
an appropriate state. At system level, the Si's must show the 
ability of the system to answer the SF's demands. These indica-
tions may have different forms upon the way in which the systems 
are called. Useful information could be obtained form the 
existing PSA updated with the operating experience. However, it 
is possible that the operating modes, operating parameters, 
configurations, etc. for the systems during plant operation are 
different from the assumptions used in PSA. It is also possible 
that a system have components, trains, or other modules unavail-
able because they are under Test and Maintenance (T 6 M) or 
Repairs (R) activities, or generally, the system is in a degraded 
state. So, it is important to define the representative parame-
ters for these states and to have a continuous indication on 
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these. Obviously, these parameters will not be necessary the sue 
for all the systems. 
The information at the system level in PSA is, generally, includ-
ed in the Fault trees (FT). The level of detail is, however, very 
deep (we may have as basic evenLs failure modes of the compo-
nents, including components in the support systems, failures in 
the instrumentation and control chains, different human errors, 
etc.) and therefore it is difficult to obtain the essential data 
which have to be easy for use in operational safety evaluations. 
For these analysis, the level of detail must be chosen very 
carefully using engineering judgements following the functions 
and tasks of the system. At this level we shall find the new 
Basic Events related to failures in components, trains/sub-
systems/modules etc. Based on a functional analysis on the 
ability of the system to answer at the SF demands, it is possible 
to establish a modular structure of the system and to analyze the 
system at this particular level with e.g. fault tree method. We 
shall call this method - the Nodule-System Approach (MSA). 
For instance, a pump line can be considered a module, and also, 
redundant lines or set of overpressure valves, etc. and failure 
of these modules will be the intermediate or basic events in the 
new FT. The ability of a module to perform its function can be 
established not only in probabilistic terms (availability, 
reliability), but also by process parameters (e.g.: flow and 
pressure at the exit of a pump line module give good indications 
on the state of the module). It will not be a surprise to find 
such parameters as those monitored in the control room but now 
their safety meaning will be emphasized. 
Obviously, different approaches should be used for standby 
(safety) systems whose main object is to act on demand, and for 
the systems with continuous operation whose main task is to 
continuously accomplish their function for a long period of time. 
If for the latter the process parameters in the system during 
operation could provide useful information related to the safety 
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aspects, not the same thing can always be said if we consider the 
systems in the first category. 
However, the relations between the modules, both qualitative and 
quantitative and their importance in the system could provide 
useful criteria. 
From the quantitative (numerical) point of view, we may find the 
numerical criteria acceptable for these modules as function of 
the target values imposed for the whole system (e.g. criteria for 
series-modules, evaluation of the redundancy level required). 
Table 3. Maintenance Indicators, /ll/. 
1. Annunciator Alarms Continuously on: 
Lifted leads 
Maintenance Work Request (MHR) on Safety Related 
Equipment 
# of Components Tagged out for Maintenance more than 3 
months 
- # of Missed Surveillance on Equipment 
# of MWRs Written by Maintenance Personnel 
# of Repeat Maintenance Items 
# of Temporary Modifications over 3 months Delay (%) 
Realignment Errors During Maintenance 
Temporary Modifications 
Wrong Unit/Wrong Train Events 
2. % Corrective MWRs Older than 3 months 
3. % LERs due to Maintenance 
4. % Preventive MWRs Completed on Safety Equipment 
5. Accumulated Duration of Limited Conditions of Operation 
(LCO) Conditions 
6. Backlog of Engineering Change Notices (ECN) Related to 
Equipment Performance 
7. Backlog of Maintenance Procedure Revisions 
8. Component in LCO Condition 
9. Corrective Maintenance Backlog > 3 months 
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Table 3 (Continued) 
10. ESF Actuations due to Maintenance and Testing 
11. Fraction Labor Hours on Surveillance 
12. Fraction of MHRs Reviewed by Quality Control (QC) 
13. Fraction of Components under Condition Monitoring 
14. Gross Heat Rate (Thermal Performance 
15. Industrial Safety Loss-Time Accident Rate 
16. Maintenance Backlog 
17. Maintenance Overtime 
18. Maintenance Rework 
19. Maintenance Staff Radiation Exposure 
20. Maintenance Staff Size 
21. Mean Age of Maintenance Procedure Revisions 
22. Mean Repair Time 
23. Mean Time Between Forced Outages from Equipment Failures 
24. Mean Time Between Repairs (Host Frequently Repaired Items) 
25. Mean Time to Return to Service 
26. Number 6 Duration of BOP Equipment Out of Service 
27. Part 21 Reports 
28. Preventive Maintenance Items overdue 
29. Rate of Adoption of Industry upgrades 
30. Rate of Calibration Errors 
31. Rate of Deferred Periodic Tests 
32. Rate of Downtime due to Failures 
33. Rate of Faults Detected by Actual Demands 
34. Rate of Faults Detected by Periodic Testing 
35. Rate of LCOs 
36. Rate of Maintenance Errors 
37. Rate of Maintenance Requested Training Programs 
38. Rate of Maintenance Staff on Vendor Courses 
39. Rate of Maintenance Staff Retraining 
40. Rate of Manhotirs in Maintenance 
41. Rate of Misalignments 
42. Rate of MHRs 
43. Rate of Out-of-Service Tags 
44. Rate of Pending Modification Requests 
45. Rate of Root Cause Evaluations due to Maintenance 
46. Rate of Time Spare Parts Unavailable 
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Hfele_2. (Continued) 
47. Ratio QC/Haintenance Staff 
48. Ratio, # Hours to Repair Degraded Components/Total Mainte-
nance Hours 
49. Ratio, # of Repairs while Degraded// of Repairs Failed + 
Degraded 
50. Ratio, # of Deficiencies Discovered in Surveillance/Total 
Discovered 
51. Ratio, # of Failures During Post Maintenance Test/# of P.H. 
Test 
52. Ratio, # of Highest Priority HURs/Total HHRs 
53. Ratio, Mean Repair Time/Time to Failure or Degrade 
54. Ratio, Preventive Maintenance/Total Maintenance 
55. Ratio, Utility/Contractor Staff 
56. Repair Duration w.r.t. Allowed Outrage Times (AOT) by 
Technical Specifications 
57. Safety Systea Function Trend 
58. Scrams due to Maintenance * Testing 
59. Turnover Rate/Vacancies 
60. Hall Thinning/Pitting 
61. wrong Parts Events 
In the evaluation of the systea availability as SI, the technical 
specifications related aspects (test and maintenance, repair-
aents) should be accounted for. Extensive works to include these 
in the formulation of Performance Indicators and Safety Indica-
tors are reported in /ll/ and /6/. 
In /ll/, a comprehensive list of PI is proposed, Table 3, and 
between them, a large nuaber of safety-related indicators can be 
found. 
In /6/ is described a systematic approach for defining outage-
time criteria ("control values") at different levels (component, 
system, function, sequence, core aelt, overall risk), for differ-
ent risks (operating accident risk, shutdown accident risk, etc.) 
and other hypothesis (e.g. possible regulatory approaches, 
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strategies for aadressing different risks). The numerical quanti-
fications are based on combining the down time (planned or 
unplanned) related parameters (freguency of down time occurrence, 
down time period, accumulated down time, etc.) with the accident 
freguency where the component is down, but no information is 
given on the acceptable values for the control criteria. 
Considering that the outage times constitute deviations from the 
standard state of the systems, specific numerical criteria could 
be proposed, /8/. 
As it can be seen, for the (standby) safety systems the most 
discussions are taken on the way in which different events affect 
the availability of the system. This is confirmed by the formula-
tion on this basis of the "Safety System Function Trend" (SSFT) 
as a performance indicator, /10/, and other similar indicators 
("Safety System Performance Indicator", /17/, "Safety Grade 
Eguipment out of Service", /18/). 
A possibility for assessing the impact of the changes in the T&M 
related aspects, is to implement the appropriate new numerical 
values (as the new human error probability, test interval, etc.) 
in the risk model of the plant, using the facilities of the 
Living PSA (LPSA), and to compare the results with the previous 
ones or with the accepted SI at different levels. 
The use of LPSA, if maintained updated with the operating data, 
would also allow to obtain information on the actual unavail-
abilities (for components, trains, systems), and to support 
measures for avoiding unacceptable situations, from the risk 
standpoint.A special attention should be paid to those factors 
which have large values resulted from importance calculations. 
2.2. Indicators Associated with the Human Factor 
The impact of the human factor on the safety of the plant is 
large enough to require a special attention. The operator affects 
the risk state of the plant by the actions and the decisions in 
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the control room, as well as by the Technical-Specifications 
related activities (test, maintenance, repairments, etc.). 
From the safety standpoint it is useful to separe these actions. 
We shall call "active actions" (A.A.) those decisions and actions 
in the control room in order to mitigate the accident. The A.A. 
can be of different types as: 
manual actuation of stand-by equipments following operation 
procedures or accident procedures 
manual actuation when the automatics fails 
specific commands/actions in situations which are not 
included in procedures 
other activities related to the management of the accident 
situations. 
These actions have a direct influence on the evolution and the 
consequences of the accident. Therefore, an obvious analogy 
appears between the answer of the operator, concertized in A.A.s 
and the answer of a safety system/mitigation system. 
In this approach, it would be suggestive to place the A.A.s at 
the Event-Tree level. A similar approach is used in the out-dated 
"Safety Design Matrix" methodology, where these actions are 
included, as decision nodes, in the Event Sequence Diagrams. So, 
the target values for the numerical criteria for A.A.s (e.g. 
human error probability) could be derived from the similar 
criteria which are imposed for the safety systems/mitigation 
systems, etc. (An explanation seems to be necessary: the terms 
used for different types of systems may by unclear. This is 
because in different approaches, different terms are used: safety 
systems, process systems, mitigation systems, systems important 
for the safety, systems with safety functions, support systems, 
service systems, etc. - which have specific meanings for specific 
safety philosophies. The lack of information on the specific 
safety approaches for FORSMARK-3 prevents the use of a precise 
language). 
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On the other hand, the answer of the operator is influenced by a 
number of factors like: 
the training level 
the quality and the quantity of the information available in 
the control room 
the stress level during the accident 
- the presence of the recovery factors 
the time window available 
By an appropriate control of these factors the safety indicators 
related to the operator's A.A. could be maintained inside the 
accepted limits. 
In the second category, the Technical Specifications related 
activities are included. These activities are continuously 
performed during the operation of the plant. In the accident 
situations, these activities are important by their outcome, but 
only the A.A. can change the evolution of the accident. There-
fore, we shall call the activities of this second category 
"Passive actions" (P.A.). 
During the accident situations, their outcome is very important 
but it can no more be modified: it is "as good (as bad) as done". 
These actions cannot be equivalated with the actions of the 
safety systems/mitigation systems, and the safety indicators 
cannot be derived from the criteria for these systems. It is more 
appropriate to associate the P.A. to the Test and Maintenance 
related criteria at the system/module/component level, because 
the P.A. have influence on the time during which the system/mod-
ule/component is down. 
The Allowed Outage Times (AOT) impact on the risk was analyzed in 
extension in /6/, where the planned and unplanned outage times 
were considered, but without references to the human factor. 
However, it is obvious that unplanned outage times can result 
because of errors in P.A. (ex: misalignments, wrong unit/wrong 
train events, etc.) which must be included in analysis. 
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For instance - the error in reconfigurating the components/system 
after test or maintenance, which makes the component/system 
unavailable until the next test or surveillance, though there is 
no hardware failure (e.g.: a key/switcher in a panel which 
remains in MManual" position instead of "Remote" position). 
The contribution of the human errors related to Technical-Speci-
fications activities, to the component/system down time should be 
accounted for the evaluation of the outage times and their ac-
ceptability. 
3. APPLICATION FOR THE TfUX2 SEQUENCE 
For the analysis of this sequence, the level of technical infor-
- mation available for the systems involved (especially - the 
auxiliary feedwater system - AFWS), as well as on the operating 
experience, the T & M related aspects and the safety requirements 
for FORSMARK-3 did not permit a deep insight on tha specific 
issues. 
More, the fault tree associated with this sequence was available 
in a reduced form, without access to the assumptions for which it 
was obtained (e.g.: the basic configuration of the systems for 
which the fault tree was built, justifications for the very large 
frequencies associated with the common cause failures, boundary 
conditions, simplifications used, etc.). 
Therefore, a detailed quantitative analysis was not the final 
object but only a descriptive evaluation at AFWS and operator 
level is done. 
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3.1. Description of the Sequence 
The TfUX2 Sequence is described in /14/ and is given by a reduced 
list of the most important cut sets /l/, and their probabilities, 
Table 4. In Table 5, /l/, the codification system for the basic 
events is presented. A general flow-chart of the plant is shown 
in Fig. 1, /14/. 
The initiating event is Loss of Off Site Power (event Tf) with a 
frequency of 0.25/y, which causes the loss of the Main Feedwater 
System. 
For removing the residual heat and cooling the core (in tnis 
sequence it is assumed that the scram occurs), it is automatical-
ly actuated the Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFWS), whose electri-
cal power supply is assured by diesel generators and a gas 
turbine. 
If AFWS fails to start (event U with a probability of 1.72 * 
10"3/d) the heat in the core is not removed, the pressure in-
creases and the liquid coolant level decreases. The only possi-
bility to prevent the fuel damage because the decreasing of the 
level (below 0.5 m) is to use the Emergency Core Cooling System 
(ECCS) which, however, operates at a lower pressure level. For 
this, the operator must initiate the depressuri2ation of the core 
down to the pressure where the ECCS action is possible. If the 
operator fails to do this (event X2, with a probability of 1.0 * 
10"2/d), the fuel damage occurs. 
The frequency of this sequence is 4.3 * 10"6/y, which represents 
91% from the overall contribution of the sequences in Tf category 
to the total core melt. 
In the total core melt probability, which is 7.0 * 10"6/y for 
FORSMARK-3, the sequence TfUX2 has the most important contribu-
tion (61.4%). 
The available fault tree for this sequence, contains the most 
important 88 cut sets which represents approximately 91% from the 
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total frequency of the sequence. The most important is the cut 
set no. 1 (H314BMAN-failure of the operator to initiate the 
depressurization - and H327XOOCCF - common cause failure which 
makes all the four trains of AFWS unavailable) with a probability 
of 1.3 * 10"6/y and represents 68.4% in the total frequency of 
TfUX2. 
Besides the AFWS (327) and the operator, the following systems 
are involved: 
secondary cooling system for starting and shutdown (721) 
seawater cooling system for shutdown reactor (712) 
logic channels (516) 
However, their structure, function, operating modes, etc. as well 
as their interaction with AFWS are nor very clear. Therefore, it 
was necessary to neglect in the analysis all the aspects in which 
these systems are involved. 
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Table 4. Cuts sets for the sequence TfUX2 ordered by probability 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
1.30E-05 
2.03E-07 
1.04E-07 
1.04E-07 
1.04E-07 
1.04E-07 
1.04E-07 
1.04E-07 
1.04E-07 
1.04E-07 
1.00E-07 
3.27E-08 
3.27E-08 
3.27E-08 
3.27E-08 
3.27E-08 
3.27E-08 
3.27E-08 
3.27E-08 
2.77E-08 
2.77E-08 •. 
2.77E-08 
2.77E-08 
2.77E-08 
2.77E-08 
2.30E-08 
2.20E-08 
2.18E-08 
2.18E-08 
2.18E-08 
2.18E-08 
2.03E-08 
2.03E-08 
1.68E-08 
1.68E-08 
1.68E-08 
1.68E-08 
1.68E-08 
1.68E-08 
H314TBHAN 
H314T8MAN 
H314TBHAN 
H314TBHAN 
H314TBMAN 
H314TBHAN 
H314TBMAN 
H314TBMAN 
H314TBMAN 
H314TBHAN 
H314TBMAN 
H314TBMAN 
H314TBMAN 
H314TBHAN 
H314TBMAN 
H314TBMAN 
H314TBMAN 
H314TBHAN 
H314T8HAN 
H314TBMAN 
K314TBHAN 
H314TBMAN 
H314TBMAN 
H314TBHAN 
H314TBHAN 
H314TBMAN 
H314T8HAN 
H314TBMAN 
H314TBMAN . 
H314T6HAN 
H314TBMAN 
H314TBMAN 
H314TBMAN 
H314TBMAN 
H314TBMAN 
H314TBHAN 
H314TBMAN 
H314TBMAN 
H314TBMAN 
H327X00CCF 
H327A80CCF 
H327AB0CCF 
H327AB0CCF 
H327ABCCCF 
H327A8CCCF. 
H3278C0CCF 
H327BC0CCF 
H327AC0CCF 
H327ACDCCF 
H327MSG 
H327CHAINT 
H327CHAINT 
H327CKAINT 
H327CMAINT 
H327CMAINT 
H327CHAINT 
H327CMAINT 
H327CHAINT 
H327AB0CCF 
H327AB0CCF 
H327B0OCCF 
H327BD0CCF 
H327A0OCCF 
H327A0OCCF 
H327AST0BY 
H327AST0BY 
H327AB0CCF 
H327AC0CCF 
H327ABCCCF 
H327BCOCCF 
H327CST0BY 
H327CSTDBY 
H327VC4H1A 
H327VC2H1B ' 
H327VC4M1A 
H327VC4M1A 
H327VC4H1A 
H327VC2H1B 
H327CMAINT 
H327VC4M1A 
• H327VC2M1B 
H327VD4M1A 
H327VD2M1B 
H327VA4H1A 
H327VA2H1B 
H327VB4H1A 
H327VB2M18 
H516RCCCF 
H327V04H1A 
H327V02H1B 
H327V04M1A 
H327VD4M1A 
H327V02M1B 
H327V02H1B 
H327VD4M1A 
H327VD2M1B 
H327CMAINT 
H327CHAINT 
H327CMAINT 
H327CMAINT 
H327CMAINT 
H327CMAINT 
H327CST03Y 
H327CSTDBY 
327PC01K1A 
327PB01K1A 
327P001K1A 
327PA01K1A 
H327AB0CCF 
H327AB0CCF 
H327V04M1A 
H327VD4M1A 
H327VD2H1B 
H327VD4M1A 
H327VD4M1A 
H327VD2M1B 
H327VB4H1A 
H327V84H1A 
H327V82H1B 
H327VB4H1A 
H327V82H1B 
H327V84H1A 
H327V82M1B 
H327VB2M1B 
H327V04H1A 
H327V02H1B 
H327VA4M1A 
H327VA2M1B 
H327VB4M1A 
H327VB2M1B 
H721XO0CCF 
H712XO0CCF 
H721CMAINT 
H712CMAINT 
H327VB4M1A 
H327VB4M1A 
H327VB4M1A 
H327V82H1B 
H327VB4M1A 
H327VB4M1A 
H327VA4H1A 
H327VA4HIA 
H327VA4M1A 
H327VA2H1B 
H327VA4H1A 
H327VA2M1B 
H327VA2M1B 
H327VA2H1B 
H327VA4M1A 
H327VA4M1A 
H327VA4M1A 
H327VA4M1A 
H327VA2H1B 
H327VA4M1A 
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Table 4. (Continued) 
40. 
41. 
42. 
43. 
44. 
45. 
46. 
47. 
43. 
49. 
50. 
51. 
52. 
53. 
54. 
55. 
56. 
57. 
58. 
59. 
60. 
61. 
62. 
63. 
64. 
65. 
66. 
67. 
68. 
69. 
70. 
71. 
72. 
73. 
74. 
75. 
76. 
77. 
78. 
79. 
80. 
81. 
82. 
83. 
84. 
85. 
86. 
87. 
88. 
1.68E-08 
1.68E-08 
1.68E-08 
1.68E-08 
1.68E-08 
1.68E-08 
1.68E-08 
1.68E-08 
1.68E-08 
1.68E-08 
1.60E-08 
1.60E-08 
1.60E-08 
1.60E-08 
1.60E-08 
1.60E-08 
1.60E-08 
1.60E-08 
1.43E-08 
1.43E-08 
1.43E-08 
1.43E-08 
1.43E-08 
1.43E-08 
1.43E-08 
1.43E-08 
1.43E-08 
1.43E-08 
1.43E-08 
1.43E-08 
1.43E-08 
1.43E-08 
1.43E-08 
1.43E-08 
1.43E-08 
1.43E-08 
1.431-08 
1.43E-08 
1.43E-08 
1.43E-08 
1.43E-08 
1.43E-08 
1.21E-08 
1.21E-08 
L21E-08 
1.19E-08 
1.19E-08 
1.19E-08 
1.19E-08 
H314TBMAN 
H314TBMAN 
H314TBMAN 
H314TBMAN 
H314TBMAN 
H314TBMAN 
H314TBHAN 
H314TBHAN 
H314TBMAN 
H314TBMAN 
H314T8MAN 
H314TBMAN 
H314TBMAN 
H314TBHAN 
H314TBMAN 
H314TBMAN 
H314T8HAN 
H314TBHW 
H314TBMAN 
H314TBMAN 
H314TBMAN 
H314TBMAN 
H314TBMAN 
H314TBHAN 
H314TBHAN 
H314TBMAN 
H314TBMAN 
H314TBMAN 
H314TBHAN 
H314TBHAN 
H314TBMAN 
H314TBMAN 
H314TBKAN 
H314TBMAN 
H314TBHAN 
H314TBHAN 
H314TBHAN 
H314TBMAN" 
H314TBHAN 
H314TBHAN 
H314TBHAN 
H314TBKAN 
H314TBMAN 
H314TBHAN 
H314TBHAN 
H314TBHAN 
H314TBMAN 
H314TBMAN 
H314TBMAN 
H327VC2H1B 
H327VC2M1B 
H327VC4H1A 
H327VC4M1A 
H327VC4M1A 
H327VC2M1B 
H327ve2HlB 
H327VC2M1B 
H327VC4M1A 
H327VC2H1B 
H327AC0CCF 
H327ABCCCF 
H327ABCCCF 
H327ABOCCF 
H327BC0CCF 
H327AB0CCF 
H327BCDCCF 
H327AC0CCF 
H327A00CCF 
H327A00CCF 
H327B00CCF 
H327A00CCF 
H327ADOCCF 
H327B00CCF 
H327AB0CCF 
H327AB0CCF 
H327AB0CCF 
H327BC0CCF 
H327BC0CCF 
H327BC0CCF 
H327BC0CCF 
H327AC0CCF 
H327B0OCCF 
H327B00CCF 
H327AC0CCF 
H327AC0CCF 
H327AC0CCF 
H327C00CCF 
H327C00CCF 
H327C00CCF 
H327CD0CCF 
H327AB0CCF 
H327AD0CCF 
H327C00CCF 
H327AC0CCF 
H327AST0BY 
H327AST0BY 
H327ACDCCF 
H327AC0CCF 
H327V04M1A 
H327V04M1A 
H327V02M1B 
H327V02H1B 
H327V04M1A 
H327V02M1B 
H327V02M1B 
H327VD4M1A 
H327V02M1B 
H327VD2M1B 
H327VB5B1A 
H327V05B1A 
H327VD3B1A 
H327VC5B1A 
H327VA3B1A 
H327VC3B1A 
H327VA5B1A 
H327VB3B1A 
H327VC4M1A 
H327VC2M1B 
H327VC4M1A 
H327VC4M1A 
H327VC2M1B 
H327VC2M1B 
• H327VC4H1A 
H327VC4H1A 
H327VC2M1B 
H327V04M1A 
H327V02M1B 
H327V04M1A 
H327V02M1B 
H327V04H1A 
H327VC4M1A 
H327VC2M1B 
H327V02M1B 
H327V04M1A 
H327V02H18 
H327VB4H1A 
H327VB2H1B 
H327VB4H1A 
H327VB2M1B 
H327VC2M1B 
H327BC0CCF 
H327AB0CCF 
H327BD0CCF 
H327BC0CCF 
H327BC0CCF 
H327AST0BY 
H327AST08Y 
H327VB2M1B 
H327VB4M1A 
H327VB2M1B 
H327VB4M1A 
H327VB2H1B 
H327VB2M1B 
H327VB4M1A 
H327VB2H1B 
H327VB2M1B 
H327VB2H1B 
H327VB4M1A 
H327VB4M1A 
H327VA4M1A 
H327VB2M1B 
H327VB2H1B 
H327VA4H1A 
H327V02H1B 
H327V04H1A 
H327V02H1B 
H327VA4H1A 
H327VA4H1A 
H327VA2M1B 
H327VA2H1B 
H327VB4M1A 
H327VA2M1B 
H327VA2M1B 
H327VB4H1A 
H327VB2H1B 
H327VB2H1B 
H327VA4H1A 
H327VA4H1A 
H327VA2K1B 
H327VA2H1B 
H327VD4H1A 
721PA01C2A 
712PA01C2A 
712PB01C2A 
721PB01C2A 
H327VA4M1A 
H327VA2H18 
H327VA4M1A 
H327VA2H1B 
H327VA2M1B 
H327VA4M1A 
H327VA2H1B 
H327VA2M1B 
H327VA2M1B 
H327VA2H1B 
322 Containment vessel spray system 6S2 Diesel engine auxlary systems 
323 Low pressure coolant injection 712 Shutdown cooling water system 
Emergency cooling systems. 
FIR. 1. Main flow sheet of FORSMARK-3 plant. 
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Table 5. Codification system for the basic events, /!/, 
Code 
H314TBMAN 
H327XOOCCF 
H327XXXCCF 
H327/H721/H712MAINT 
H327VXXMYY 
H327MSG 
H516RCCF 
H327XXOCCF 
H327ASTDBY 
H721XOOCCF 
H712X00CCF 
327PX01K1A 
H327VXXBYY 
712/721PX01C2A 
Codification system for the basic 
events, /l/ 
Failing manual depressurization 
Quadruple Common Cause Failure 
(CCF) in the system 327 (AFWS) 
Triple CCF in 327 
Maintenance in 327, 721 or 712 
Valve (MOV) in 327 fails to close/ 
open 
Non-appearing/Blocked Actuation 
Signal in 327 
CCF in 3/4 logic channels 
Double CCF in 327 
Operation > 0.5 h in standby loop 
for the train A in 327 
Quadruple CCF in 721 I 
Quadruple CCF in 712 
Reciprocating pump (RP) fails to 
start 
Check valve (CHV) fails to open 
Centrifugal pump (CP) fails to 
start 
3.2. Safety Indicators 
In the sequence TfUX2, the AFWS is automatically actuated after 
the loss of main feedwater system and, after the actuation, it 
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must be able to operate for a relative short period of time 
(hours) until the recovery of the Off-Site Power Supply and thus, 
the recovery of the main feedwater system. 
The safety indicators of AFNS level are related to the capacity 
of the system to operate "on demand". An evaluation of the SI for 
AFWS (in terms of "System unavailability" on "Failure probability 
on demand") should be done following the contribution of this 
system by different sequences to the core melt probability. 
A detailed analysis, as described in /6/ and /10/ is relied on 
the knowledge of the factors which influence the planned and 
unplanned outage times which affects the availability of the 
system. They include the T fc M related aspects, the history of 
operation, repairment outcomes, impacts from other systems, etc. 
As mentioned above, the lack of data makes such analysis beyond 
the scope of this paper. 
For th*» simplicity of the analysis, we may suppose that the AFWS 
in FORSMARK-3 is regarded as a mitigation system for which a good 
requirement for the failure probability per demand is 10~2. As it 
is known, AFWS is made by four identical trains in parallel which 
assure a 4 x 100% redundancy l*»vel. Despite that, the overall 
availability of the system is strongly reduced because of the 
common cause failures which could make two, three, or even all 
the four trains unavailable. 
Using MSA (se cap. 2.1) - it can be demonstrated that, given the 
target criteria for the system failure probability per demand 
(qST) and the frequency of the common cause failures of different 
order (qCcFi)' t n e target value for a single train (q^) is 
solution of the equation: 
q£r + £ Cn qcci g£f ^q^ 
n = degree of redundancy 
1 = order of the common cause failure, 
i - 2, , n 
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For our case, n - 4, and, from /l/, 
qccM = 1.3 * 10"3/d 
qCCF3 = 2.9 * 10-*/d 
qcc^ = 1.1* l0-3/d 
We obtain, for q^ = 10-2/d 
qrr = 0.296/d 
The value seems to be very high, but this is because of the very 
high redundancy level and because of the low value assumed for 
1ST-
However, during operation, one train may be unavailable (during 
T ft M activities, for instance). In this situation, the level of 
redundancies is reduced to 3 * 100% (n=3 in eq. 1) and the target 
values at the train level is now 
q^ r = 0.1979/d for q^ = 10~2/d 
and this value should be assured. Obviously, other calculations 
could be done. If we impose that the target for AFWS failure 
probability on demand should be the value used in PSA (1.72 * 
10"3/d), then, for n»3 we obtain q^ = 3.06 * 10"2/d. 
Establishing such criteria at a lower level (train level, e.g.) 
has the advantage that, for assessing from the risk point of view 
the various deviations from the standard state of the system (as 
considered in PSA), the level of complexity for the risk model 
required to calculate these indicators is much reduced. 
In terms of "unavailability", the performance of AFWS is influ-
enced by the maintenance performed in AFWS (event H327CMAINT 
and, in a lower measure, by the events H327AMAINT, H327BMAINT and 
H327DMAINT) as well as by the maintenance in the support systems 
(events H712CMAINT and H721CMAINT). 
H327CMAINT with a probability of 7 * 10"2 has a large contribu-
tion in the frequence of TfUX2. It can be seen (Tab. 4) that, 
during this event, at least one of the other trains of AFWS (A, 
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B, or D) mist be available. Similar conclusions are obtained if 
the minimal cut sets containing H721CMAIHT and H712CHAINT are 
analysed. 
The use of a LPSA in this probles, requires special demands as: 
the plant risk model mist be detailed enough to allow an 
appropriate modelling of the TfcM factors included in these 
events in order to evaluate the impact on the risk for 
possible changes 
- the pre processed information must allow the identification 
of the minimal cut sets containing a component/train which 
can be down during TfcM and the realignments required in this 
case (if any), including the interface with the support 
systems 
the updated risk models must allow the identification of the 
momentan unavailabilities at lower levels (e.g. at train 
level for AFWS). 
Another component of the TfUX2 sequence is the event X2: the 
failure of the operator to depressurize the reactor. The proba-
bility of this event, as it is used in /14/, is 1.0 * 10~2/d. 
The depressurization is supposed to be done manually in order to 
avoid economical losses in the case of a spurious actuation of an 
would-be automatic actuation. 
Therefore, this operator action (an active action, as stated in 
2.2) can be equivalated with the action of a safety system or of 
a mitigation (process) system, and the operator (team) in the 
control room-regarded as such a system. 
A detailed analysis was done in /4/ and the results obtained with 
different methods are summarized in Table 6. 
If we compare these values with a general accepted value for the 
failure probability on demand for a safety system (l0~3/d) /9/, 
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we observe that the performance of the operator must be improved 
(e.g.: by special training for this sequence, better access to 
the key and, especially, by assuring the presence of the lecovery 
factors). If, however, the manual depressurization is equivalated 
with the action of a mitigation system, with the target value for 
the failure probability on demand of lO~2/d, the assurance of the 
effectiveness of the recovery factors in the control room is 
enough to cope with this criteria. 
Another solution is to replace the manual depressurization with 
an automatic system for actuation for which the safety criteria 
for reliability and availability should be assured. In this case, 
an analysis of the economical risk due to the possibility of a 
spurious actuation have to be done. 
Table 6. Failure probabilities for the manual depressurization. 
/«/• 
Method 
Case A 
Case B 
THERP 
7.4 * 10"3 
2.6 * 10"1 
HCR 
4.5 * 10"3 
5.5 * 10"1 
Case A: with recovery factors 
Case B: no recovery factors 
27 
4. CONCLUSION 
The continuous evaluation from the safety point of view of 
different situations which appear during the operation (deviation 
from the conditions assumed in PSA, including unavailabilities at 
different levels, alternative operating regimes, etc.) require 
the implementation of a system of safety indicators which should 
provide reliable information on the impact of these situations on 
the safety and risk. 
This problem is very complex and systematic studies should be 
done. 
From the risk point of view, most of the works must be focussed 
on the safety systems as well as on the operator actions, both 
those in the control room during the accidents and those related 
to test and maintenance. 
The analysis and calculations performed for the TfUX2 accident 
sequence for FORSMARK-3 have shown that the criteria for failure 
probability per demand for a single train in AFWS are restrictive 
because of the very high values for the common cause failure 
probabilities. Any improvement of AFWS performance is strongly 
conditioned by the reduction of the common cause failure proba-
bilities or by diminishing their importance. 
Regarding the manual depressurization (event X2 in the sequence) 
- the failure probability used in PSA (10~2) is under the level 
of a safety system requirement and, also under the probability of 
the other event in the sequence (1.72 * 10"3 for the event U). 
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